This page maps every SAFE research requirement to its implementation artifact, evidence type, and dissertation wording. Entries labeled Stub or Partial are intentional prototype-scope limitations — not software bugs. Use the filter controls below to explore by research question, status, or evidence type. Click any row to expand its evidence panel with dissertation-ready wording.
Evaluate whether ZK-SNARK proof protocols can operate within the timing, bandwidth, and reliability constraints of a tactical coalition sensor fusion system.
Demonstrate that a policy-score-driven gatekeeper outperforms a simple proof-check baseline in distinguishing legitimate tracks from adversarial inputs under mixed conditions.
Verify that recipient binding, Bloom-filter incest detection, and clearance-based field visibility provide adequate data provenance and access control across a multi-hop coalition topology.
| ID | RQ | Category | Requirement / Claim | Evidence | Status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| rq1-l1-fidelity | RQ1 | ZKP Layer | Layer 1 — Verifiable Fidelity | Chart | Stub | |
| rq1-l2-lineage | RQ1 | ZKP Layer | Layer 2 — Anonymous Lineage | Chart | Stub | |
| rq1-l3-identity | RQ1 | ZKP Layer | Layer 3 — Physics-Based Identity | Chart | Stub | |
| rq1-l4-freshness | RQ1 | ZKP Layer | Layer 4 — Freshness Binding | Sim Event | Partial | |
| rq1-l5-recipient | RQ1 | ZKP Layer | Layer 5 — Recipient Binding | UI Widget | Partial | |
| rq1-protocol-comparison | RQ1 | ZKP Layer | ZKP Protocol Comparison | Export | Addressed | |
| rq2-policy-score | RQ2 | Gatekeeper | Policy Score Computation | Chart | Addressed | |
| rq2-fusion-mode | RQ2 | Gatekeeper | Gatekeeper Fusion Mode Selection | Sim Event | Addressed | |
| rq2-safe-vs-baseline | RQ2 | Gatekeeper | SAFE vs Baseline Comparison | Export | Addressed | |
| rq2-audit-log | RQ2 | Gatekeeper | Gatekeeper Audit Log | UI Widget | Addressed | |
| rq3-bloom-lineage | RQ3 | Lineage | Bloom Filter Incest Detection | UI Widget | Partial | |
| rq3-lineage-depth | RQ3 | Lineage | Lineage Depth Distribution | Chart | Addressed | |
| rq3-epoch-rotation | RQ3 | Lineage | Ephemeral Epoch Rotation | UI Widget | Partial | |
| rq3-clearance-visibility | RQ3 | Dissemination | Clearance-Based Field Visibility | UI Widget | Addressed | |
| rq3-attack-routing | RQ3 | Dissemination | Attack Type Routing | Chart | Addressed | |
| sim-zk-pipeline | SIM | Simulation | ZK Pipeline Panel (Per-Track) | UI Widget | Addressed | |
| sim-gatekeeper-audit | SIM | Simulation | Gatekeeper Audit Trail (SIM) | Sim Event | Addressed | |
| sim-coalition-threat | SIM | Simulation | Coalition Threat Model | Sim Event | Addressed | |
| dash-task-tracker | Dashboard | Dashboard | Research Task Tracker | Claim | Addressed | |
| dash-sim-runs | Dashboard | Dashboard | Simulation Run Persistence | Export | Addressed | |
| lim-stub-prover | Limitation | Limitation | Stub ZK Prover | Limitation | Out of Scope | |
| lim-trusted-setup | Limitation | Limitation | Simulated Trusted Setup | Limitation | Out of Scope | |
| lim-no-rate-limiting | Limitation | Limitation | No Server-Side Rate Limiting | Limitation | Out of Scope | |
| lim-no-byzantine | Limitation | Limitation | Limited Byzantine Fault Injection | Limitation | Partial | |
| lim-audit-log-persistence | Limitation | Limitation | In-Memory Audit Log | Limitation | Partial |
All proof generation uses calibrated timing with random hex proof strings. No real PLONK/GROTH16/STARK circuits.
•"Not a software bug — real ZK circuit compilation requires native toolchain (circom, snarkjs, or Noir)."
•"Timing calibrated against published PLONK benchmarks on commodity hardware."
•"Future work: integrate a real PLONK prover (e.g., Bellman or Halo2) as a backend service."
Trusted setup ceremony is simulated as a version string. No real structured reference string (SRS) is generated or consumed.
•"PLONK/GROTH16 require a one-time or per-circuit trusted setup ceremony."
•"Prototype uses a static string "universal-srs-v2" to mark the concept without executing it."
•"Production: use a universal SRS (Powers of Tau) or a per-circuit Groth16 ceremony."
Gatekeeper rate limiting is not implemented. A production deployment would throttle proof verification requests per node.
•"Rate limiting is a deployment concern outside prototype scope."
•"Future work: implement token-bucket rate limiter at gatekeeper ingress per coalition node."
Replay, incest, and proof spoof attacks are simulated. Deep Byzantine fault injection (e.g., Sybil nodes with colluding proofs) is not fully modelled.
•"Prototype simulates three adversarial modes: replay, incest, and link degradation."
•"Deep Byzantine modelling (colluding proof-spoofing nodes) is out of scope for Phase 1."
•"Future work: add multi-node coalition Byzantine scenarios with collusion detection."
Audit log in the UI components resets on page reload. sim_events table now provides persistent per-event storage for exported runs.
•"UI audit log is ephemeral. Persistent evidence available via Simulation Exports → save run → sim_events table."
•"Not a software bug — extending to full persistent audit trail requires server-side log stream."